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One of the most difficult problems in the social sciences is measuring the policy climate in societies.
Prior to the 1930s the vast majority of labor regulations in the U.S. were enacted at the state level.
In this paper we develop several summary measures of labor regulation that document the changes
in labor regulation across states and over time during the Progressive Era.  The measures include an
Employer-Share-Weighted Index (ESWI) that weights regulations by the share of workers affected
and builds up the overall index from 17 categories of regulation; the number of pages of laws; appropriations
for spending on labor issues per worker; and two nonparametric COORDINATES that summarize
locations in a policy space.  We describe the pluses and minuses of the measures, how strongly they
are correlated, and show the stories that they tell about the changes in labor regulation during the progressive
era.  We then provide preliminary evidence on the extent to which the labor regulation measures are
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Lifting the Curse of Dimensionality:  Measures of the Labor Legislation Climate 
in the States During the Progressive Era  
 
One of the most difficult problems in the social sciences arises when trying to develop 
summary measures of the policy climate in societies.   Government regulation, constitutions, 
and legal structures are often messy and not easily quantified.  In modern societies they often 
involve thousands of pages of laws, court decisions, and administrative decisions within the 
government, as well as in external assessments by politicians, lawyers, and scholars.   Yet 
summary measures that isolate the key components of the policy climate are necessary for 
developing an understanding of how the measures were adopted and their impact on societies.   
Over the past few decades, as statistical analysis has begun to play an increasing role in 
the social sciences, scholars have developed a wide variety of quantitative measures of features 
that do not lend themselves easily to measurement.   For example, Jack Walker (1969) 
developed an “innovation score” to describe the changes in state government policies before 
1965 for 88 different programs.
1  Poole and Rosenthal (1991, 1997, 2000) and Poole (2005) 
use measures of legislative voting to develop “spatial coordinates” that describe the typical 
positions in the public policy space of the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament.  
Alternative measures of voting ideology have been created during the same era by Berry, 
Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998).  Numerous scholars have found this work useful for 
estimating the influences on policy and the influence of policy on social factors.
2 
Scholars and policy makers interested in the study of the importance of Democracy, the 
extent of market economies, and the protection of individual freedoms have developed indices 
like the Index of Economic Freedom, the Freedom House scores, and the rule-of-law.  These   4
have been used by a large number of social scientists in analyzing the determinants of these 
policies and their impact on economic growth and other measures of the success of society.
3  
Nearly every historian of labor relations and labor markets examines the role of 
governments in determining (or not determining) rules for collective action, arbitration of 
disagreements between workers and employers, and standards for the terms of employment.
4  
Whether the work is narrative or quantitative in nature, nearly all grapple with issues about 
how best to describe the nature of government policies.
5   
To aid businesses, unions, and workers understanding of the labor regulation climate 
during the Progressive Era, the U.S. Commissioner of Labor and then the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics published volumes that described the text of all of the labor statutes on the books in 
the states.  In the 1930s John R. Commons and his Associates, in particular, Elizabeth 
Brandeis, offered detailed assessments of these policies in their History of Labor in the United 
States.
 6  Having worked with these sources and the original statutes and studied many court 
decisions in the course of studying workers’ compensation and other labor issues, we have seen 
the great diversity and breadth in labor regulations.  This diversity sometimes gets lost in the 
analysis of labor legislation during the Progressive Era because most scholars have sought to 
focus on specific policies, like workers’ compensation or child labor laws.  Recognizing the 
interactions of these laws with the broader regulatory climate is likely to be important, 
however, because the broader setting likely influenced the adoption and impact of the specific 
policies.     
Our goal in working on this project has been to develop several summary measures of 
the overall labor regulation climate at the state level during the Progressive Era.  We offer 
several different types of measures to try to capture different aspects of the regulatory climate   5
and to check the degree to which these measures are correlated with each other.  The measures 
are used to show the expansion of labor regulation both within and across states over the 
course of the Progressive Era.  We conclude with some preliminary analysis of political and 
labor market correlates that influenced the spatial and geographic variation in the measures 
over time.    
Another goal of the project is to give more recognition to the extent of labor legislation 
at the state level that existed before the federal involvement that arose during the New Deal.  
Labor historians are well aware of the role played by the states in regulating labor markets in 
the early 1900s.  Based on our observations at conferences, many social scientists who study 
the modern era are not.  By creating measures of labor market regulation that can be 
aggregated to the national level, we hope that the measures will cause such social scientists to 
be aware of the extent of regulation in place before the national government got involved.   
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Increasingly large numbers of workers entered the industrial sector between the end of 
the Civil War and the 1920s.  The adoption of new machinery and new methods of organizing 
work led to an expansion in the size of workplaces.  Workers who entered the workforce in the 
1870s experienced dramatic changes in the nature of workplaces.  Many started in agriculture 
or in small hand manufacturing operations where there were strong personal relations between 
the worker and the employer.  As the decades passed, many ended up in larger operations with 
more impersonal relationships. 
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of immigrants arrived and began working in the 
mines and many of the leading industries.   Many workers felt that they had lost a significant   6
degree of control over their work situation.  They had less interaction with the owners of the 
firm and their employment situation could be threatened by national and international market 
forces over which even their employer had no control.   A number of workers responded by 
joining unions, including unions with broad coverage like the Knights of Labor in the late 
1870s and the 1880s, and the more narrowly construed unions focused on their craft or 
industry.   
Another response was for workers to join with a wide range of social reform groups to 
seek more state regulation of the workplace.  Workers were not always opposed by employers 
when they sought regulations.  In fact, Fishback (1998), among others, has suggested that 
progressive employers, often larger and more likely to be unionized, supported new regulations 
that codified their own practices or cost them little to put in place.   He argues that many of the 
progressive era labor regulations were enacted when leading employers joined workers and 
reformers in pushing for new regulation.  One sign that this was likely to be true was the lack 
of success of workers and reformers in their attempts to push for state health insurance and 
unemployment insurance, two policies actively opposed by many large employers.
7    
Nearly all the regulatory activity during the Progressive Era took place in state 
governments.
8   As a result, the national regulatory environment often looked like a patchwork 
quilt that was constantly being reworked.  One reason was that some activities, like coal 
mining, took place in half or fewer states.  For more general regulations, like workers’ 
compensation, the political structure and the strength of interest groups in the economy varied 
substantially from state to state, leading to differences in the timing of adoption of the laws.     
The range of issues addressed was impressive.   As seen in Table 1, many of the mining 
states were early adopters of rudimentary mining regulations that called for the filing of maps   7
and provision of basic ventilation between 1869 and 1880.  Simultaneously at the behest of the 
nascent union movement many states established bureaus to collect labor statistics, often in the 
form of surveys of workers.  By the 1880s some states had began putting more teeth in the 
regulations by providing for inspectors of boilers, factories, and mines.    When the inspectors 
found violations, the state attorney general or prosecutors would then take the employer to 
court to determine the extent of the defense and the fine to be paid.   As the pressures for 
collective bargaining arose in the late 1870s and 1880s, a number of states established 
mediation, arbitration, and conciliatory bodies to aid in settling strikes (Currie and Ferrie 
2000).   The struggles between striking workers and employers carried into the legislature as 
each side sought support from the state in establishing the rules for bargaining.   Some states 
passed laws that promoted unionization by outlawing “yellow dog” contracts and protecting 
union trademarks and labels.  On the other hand, other states seemed bent on limiting 
unionization with the passage of anti-enticement laws and laws that limited picketing and were 
specifically targeted at reducing intimidation of non-union workers.   Meanwhile, a number of 
professionals sought forms of occupational licensing that can be seen as attempts to control the 
quality of service provided and/or to raise the incomes of the licensed professionals by limiting 
entry.
9 
Various states legislated limits on wages and hours of male workers, although such 
laws were so broadly written as to have little meaning or were struck down by the courts.  
Limits established for child labor and women’s hours were more successful.   Perceptions of 
increased dangers associated with industrialization caused states to pass laws regulating 
workplace safety and developing new rules for the compensation of injured workers.     8
Using the volumes published by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1896, 1904, 1908) 
and later the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1914, 1925), Commons and Associates (1966), and the 
annual or semiannual state reports on new statutes passed by the legislatures, Rebecca Holmes 
(2003, 2005) accumulated a database that covers each year from 1900 through 1925 and 
identifies which states had each of 135 different labor laws for her dissertation.  In the course 
of pursuing other projects, we have added information on the total number of pages devoted to 
all labor laws in the states, and the extent of state legislature’s appropriations for spending on 
the administration and enforcement of their labor laws.   The goal of this paper is to use this 
information to develop measures of the changing labor regulatory climate in the states during 
the Progressive Era.    
The presence of so many types of laws would have been considered a blessing to those 
who succeeded in getting them passed.  However, someone seeking to develop a broad picture 
of the regulatory climate faces the curse of dimensionality.  We seek to lift the curse by coming 
up with a series of summary measures of the regulatory climate that allow for summary 
comparisons both across states and time. 
In a recent paper in a volume honoring Thomas Weiss, we began to lift the curse by 
creating a series of indexes that involved a simple count of the laws, an index that reweighted 
the laws by putting them into specific categories of laws and then summing across categories, 
and then indices that weighted laws by the share of the workforce affected by the laws (see 
Holmes, Fishback, and Allen 2008).   We found that all of these measures were highly 
correlated with each other.  Cross-sectional correlations for the 48 states between the measures 
were above 0.96 in 1919, 0.97 in 1909, and 0.96 in 1899.  Correlations of the change over time   9
in the indices were above 0.89 for the change from 1899 to 1919, above 0.87 for the change 
from 1899 to 1909, and above 0.89 for the change from 1909 to 1919. 
The most conceptually appealing of the indices in that paper was the Employment- 
Share-Weighted Index (ESWI).  In the index we divided the laws into 17 categories and each 
of the laws within the categories are weighted by the share of workers directly covered by the 
law.  In this way multiple laws dealing with the same issue are not given too much weight.  
Nor were laws specific to a subset of the workforce given weight that exceeded their share of 
the workforce.      
In this paper we compare the ESWI with other measures of labor legislation, including 
the number of pages devoted to labor laws, the state appropriations for administering and 
enforcing the labor laws, and a pair of COORDINATE measures that use the information on 
over 130 labor laws to examine how closely the labor laws of each state match each other.  No 
single measure fully captures the labor climate.  Scholars will likely differ on how much 
weight to give to each law in the ESWI.  There are so many laws that a debate over weights 
could be endless.  Page numbers and labor spending provide alternative ways of measuring the 
breadth and depth of the laws and enforcement and the COORDINATE measures offer an 
alternative check that is largely derived from a data-mining exercise. 
Our goal is to provide all of these measures and check their comparability to see if they 
describe similar patterns over time and across states.   We chose these measures because they 
seemed a reasonable start.  The complete set of data on the laws will be posted at Price 
Fishback’s website in the medium run and eventually the ICPSR website, so that other scholars 
can develop their own indices if they find the ones described in this paper do not meet their 
research goals.  Readers should recognize one caveat on the use of the information that will be   10
posted.  Scholars focusing on a specific law or set of laws should see the information as a 
starting point for their research.   We have no illusions that we have captured all of the 
subtleties of particular laws and careful reading of the laws to further refine the measures is 
advised when analyzing each specific law.     
 
CONSTRUCTING THE ESWI 
The ESWI is constructed with the laws listed in Appendix Table 1 compiled from the 
reports on “Labor Laws in the United States by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1896, 1904, 
1908) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1914, 1925).
10  The laws are divided into 17 
categories:  Workplace activity regulation, which includes specific regulations for factories, 
mines, railroads, street railroads, and limits on occupational entry; Hours regulations for 
women, children and some groups; Workplace activity regulation for women and children, 
which are additional regulations of workplace activity specifically focused on women and 
children and thus kept separate;  Employer liability and workers’ compensation; Steam boiler 
inspections; Unionization and Bargaining, which include positive values for laws that favored 
unions and negative values for those making unionization more difficult; Laws that prohibit 
bribery and coercion and protect political freedoms;  the presence of a Department of Labor or 
Bureau of Labor Statistics; the presence of a  State Board of Arbitration, Mediation, or 
Conciliation; the presence of a  Rehabilitation Commission; the presence of an Industrial 
Commission, which is kept separate from Departments of Labor because some commissions 
had rule-making authority not given to labor departments; Free Employment Offices; Anti-
Discrimination; Payday Regulations; Holiday Regulations; Minimum Wage Regulations; and 
Miscellaneous Regulations.      11
Within each law category j we develop an Employment Share-Weighted Index (ESWI) 
that is designed to sum to a maximum value of one for that category.  We chose the value of 
one as a maximum to avoid giving too much weight to a law that is just one of many in a 
category like workplace activity.   In this method the categories of laws are given equal weight. 
A law within any category is weighted by the share of the nonagricultural workforce 
covered by the law as of 1900.  If the law deals only with miners, for example, it is therefore 
given a much smaller weight than if it deals with all workers.   The mathematical formula for 
the ESWI within category j is    
ESWIjst =  Σ  (Lijstk *Ss1900k)/ mj   for i = 1 to mj.   
for the state s in year t.   The law Lijstk refers to the ith law in category j in state s in year t 
covering the kth category of workers.   If the law is in force, Lijstk has a value of one; if not, it 
takes a value of zero.  As an example of how an actual law fits the subscripts, consider bakery 
regulation.  The bakery regulation law (i) comes under the category Economic Activity 
Regulations (j) in West Virginia (s) in 1919 (t) for bakers (k).    
To take into account the fact that the bakery regulations only cover bakers and not the 
rest of the workforce, we multiply the law by the share of nonfarm workers in baking (k) in 
state s in the year 1900 (Ss1900k).   The employment weight is one when the k subscript refers to 
regulations that apply to all nonagricultural workers.
11  The weights for each employment 
category k in each state are based on information from the 1900 census on the number of 
gainfully employed men, women, and children in occupations in 1900 and the average numbers 
of each type employed in various manufacturing industries in 1899 (U.S. Bureau of Census, 
1904, 1902 volumes 7 and 8, and Haines (ICPSR 2896)).  We chose the 1900/1899 weights to 
reflect the situation in the first year for which we make cross-state comparisons of the labor   12
laws.  We then continue to use the 1900/1899 weights for all other periods to avoid feedback 
problems where changes in regulation are causing changes in the shares of people in industries.  
This weighting still potentially has some problems with feedback effects for the 1899 ESW 
index.  We chose this period to develop the employment shares because we thought that the 
situation in 1890 would not be reflective of the employment in the 20
th century because the late 
1800s were a period of industrial change.     As another way to avoid problems with specific 
state distributions being influenced by the labor laws in the state, we have also developed an 
index where the weights are based on the national distributions across occupations and 
industries (and thus the s subscript is dropped for the employment share).  It turns out that the 
indices based on the national employment weights are very strongly correlated with the indices 
based on the state employment weights. 
In calculating the employment shares we use as the denominator an “employment base” 
composed of the number of gainfully employed in trade, transport, manufacturing, and 
mechanical pursuits from the 1900 Census of Occupations.   These categories include miners 
and construction workers and were the focus of nearly all of the labor regulations.  The 
denominator probably overstates the number of people likely to be affected by regulation 
because workers in wholesale and retail trade were less affected by the labor regulations.  The 
workers left out of the base are professional workers, domestic and personal service workers, 
and agricultural workers.  The agricultural, domestic, and personal service workers were often 
explicitly left uncovered by many regulations.  Some professionals were licensed and we do 
include in the numerator a licensing measure for specific occupations but the workers in these 
occupations account for a very small share of the professionals and an even smaller share of   13
workers subject to regulation; therefore, we don’t see that their absence in the denominator will 
be a serious problem.
12     
After weighting the law by the employment share, we sum the values for the laws in 
category j and divide by the number of laws in that category (mj).  This insures that the 
maximum value for category j is one.  As seen in Appendix Table 2, the number of laws (mj) in 
the Workplace Activity category (j) is 38, so the sum of all of the laws after they have been 
weighted by their employment share is then divided by 38.  Given that the laws are weighted 
by the share of people employed and some of the laws were likely to be focused on only 
subgroups of workers, the ESWI for category k could be substantially less than one.   
The ESWI for two law categories are based on measures other than pure law counts.  In 
the employer liability and workers’ compensation category, we used Fishback’s and Kantor’s 
(2000) expected benefits measures as a percentage of annual income as the basis for the index.  
For years when workers’ compensation was in place the expected benefits were calculated 
using the specific parameters for the laws.  The typical workers’ compensation value was 
above 1 and ranged as high as 2.82.  For years in which no workers’ compensation laws were 
in force, we started with a ratio of expected benefits to annual income of 0.5 based on Fishback 
and Kantor’s comparisons of expected payouts under employer liability and workers’ 
compensation.  The expected benefit/income ratio for states without workers’ compensation 
was then adjusted upwards from 0.5 in states where the actuaries suggested higher employer 
liability premiums to insurers based on employer liability laws that would lead to higher 
payouts to workers.  The expected benefit/income ratio was lowered from 0.5 in states where 
lower premiums were suggested by the actuaries.  The variable is expben10 in the wcdata.xls 
Excel spreadsheet under Workers’ Compensation Project Data at   14
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~fishback/ used in March 2006.   Descriptions of the construction of 
the variable are in Fishback and Kantor (2000, Appendix B) and at the same website.   To 
index the values we divided by the maximum value of 2.82 so the value would range between 
zero and one.   
In the male-hours category, a number of states passed general maximum hours laws in 
the late 1800s that stated that the official work day was an eight-hour day but typically added 
the proviso, “unless specified otherwise by contract.”  We gave them a maximum value of 0.1.   
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics suggested that these laws had little effect because of the 
contracting out clause and lack of enforcement.  The laws were weakened further after the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1905 declared that New York state regulation of bakers’ hours violated the 
U.S. Constitution.
13  We decided to assign them some positive value because some employers 
might have routinely followed the law even without much enforcement and because the laws 
likely triggered some negotiations of contracts that might have led to hours reductions.  Once 
the new hours structure was in place, these employers might have decided to leave them in 
place even after the 1905 decision.
14    
To calculate the overall ESWI for a state-year, we take the ESWI for each category j 
and sum across all seventeen categories and then divide by 17.
15   Thus, the formula for the 
overall ESW Index for state s in year t in year      
 
ESWIst  =  Σ ESWIjst /17  for j = 1 to 17.  
=  Σ (Σ  (Lijstk*Ss1900k)/mj   for i = 1 to mj)/17 for j = 1 to 17.
16     15
The final value has a maximum value of one when all workers are covered by every phase of 
regulations that workers favored.  If there were no laws except anti-union laws, the value could 
fall below zero.     
  The maps in Figure 1 shows the ESWI for the states in 1899, 1909, 1914, and 1919, 
respectively.  The scale for each of the maps is the same and is based on putting states into 5 
roughly equal groupings based on the ESWIs in 1919; therefore, the changes over time can 
also be seen.  Figure 2 shows the information in a scatter plot with more precise values visible 
for the ESWI for 1899 and 1919.  The highest ESWIs in 1899 were above 0.4 in Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey, which collectively had the broadest range of industries.  Several Midwestern 
states,  Colorado, Massachusetts, and Montana were next in line. 
By 1909 New York had become the leader with an ESWI near .5, while Indiana, 
Colorado, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania were close 
behind (see Figure 2).  By 1919 Massachusetts had surpassed New York, which had stayed in 
roughly the same position.  The academic and political activity by institutional economists like 
John R. Commons and Richard Ely had contributed to Minnesota and Wisconsin being close 
behind.  Also, among the leaders were Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California.  The one state that 
seems to have lagged behind was New Jersey. 
In general, the rankings of the states with respect to the ESWI are pretty stable over 
time.  The upward slope of the majority of spots on scatter plots in Figure 2 show that many of 
the states who had more labor regulation circa 1899 tended to also rank highly in 1919.  The 
correlations across time of the ESWIs in Table 2 are all positive and above 0.725.   
The changes in labor legislation shed some different light on the labor regulatory 
activities in New York.  Recent media strongly states that much of the labor legislation of the   16
Progressive Era was stimulated by the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire, in which dozens of 
women textile workers died in New York City in March 1911.  The rise in the ESWI for New 
York between 1899 and 1909 and the relatively small change in the ESWI between 1909 and 
1919 suggest that there was a great deal of interest in labor legislation in New York well before 
the Fire.   The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory had been inspected and no fines imposed within the 
prior month even though it was in violation of several of the existing laws with respect to fire 
escapes and other fire prevention measures.  Many of the legislative changes that followed the 
Fire were attempts to tighten these laws and enhance enforcement.  The state did eventually 
increase its spending on inspections, but the increase in inspectors was small relative to the 
number of inspections that would have been required for all factories to be inspected annually.  
Scholars have found complaints in New York newspapers after the new laws were passed that 
many of the laws were still largely ignored and that inspections continued to be rare events.
17    
 
PAGE COUNTS 
  Some scholars have experimented with using page counts as a measure of labor 
regulation (for example, see Mulligan and Shleifer (2004)).  The argument is based on the 
notion that states with more extensive laws would have to describe them in depth.   There are 
certainly flaws in this simple method.  Laws with negative consequences for labor are given 
the same page value as those with positive consequences.   The length of the legal text also 
might overstate its power.  A law banning all labor by children under 16 and appropriating one 
million dollars to hire 500 people to enforce it can be stated succinctly.    Meanwhile, it might 
take a dozen pages to describe a set of regulations designed to make workplaces safer for   17
children.  The first does far more to guarantee that a child under 16 is safe from manufacturing 
risk.   
In other situations states might adopt specific laws for four different industries, while 
another state adopts a general law with broader coverage.  This happened with hours laws in a 
number of states, and the broader laws have greater effect even though the text of the laws is 
shorter.    
The BLS reports on the text of laws made it relatively easy to develop page counts in 
1904, 1907, and 1914 when the volumes were published.  The reports do not include 
information on the workers’ compensation laws, but this will only affect the measure for 
1914.
18   
As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4, Pennsylvania is far and away the leader in page 
counts throughout the early twentieth century with many of the same states with high ESWIs 
following behind.  Figure 3 shows maps of page counts for the states with the scale used in the 
legend based on a roughly equal distribution of states in five categories as of 1914.   The 
stability of state rankings over time is shown in the scatter plots for the page counts in 1904 
and 1914.  Most states increase the text of their labor legislation even though workers’ 
compensation is not included in the 1914 page counts.  The states held more tightly to the 
relative rankings over time than for the ESWI.  The correlations in Table 2 for the page counts 
are above .9 for all comparisons across the 18 years covered.    Notice that there appears to be 
more clumping of states around the same text levels in both periods than we saw with the law 
sum and ESW Index. 
The situations for Pennsylvania and New York help illustrate the possible 
overstatement of regulation from counting pages when there are laws written for specific   18
industries.  Pennsylvania probably had the most diverse coverage of American industries of 
any state.
19  They wrote separate and specific safety regulations for bituminous coal mining, 
anthracite coal mining, and the factories.  The state ranks near the top in the ESW Index 
comparisons, but the large body of text devoted to specific industries is what makes them a 
strong outlier here.  New York had similar breadth of coverage of industries but had almost no 
mining industry and therefore has page counts much closer to the counts in the other states.   
 
EXPENDITURES BY STATES ON LABOR ISSUES 
  The presence of laws offers only one indication of the regulatory climate for labor 
markets in the states.  Laws on the books have little impact if they are not enforced and labor 
administrators and inspectors are likely to have more influence over labor markets with more 
resources available to them.  As an additional measure of the labor regulatory climate, we have 
collected information from the legislative statutes on the appropriations for the state labor 
department, board of arbitration, free employment offices, mining inspection, boiler inspection 
and other administrations related to labor markets.
20   To date, we have coverage for all states 
in the years 1903 through 1916.  We then calculate a measure of state labor spending in 1967 
dollars per person employed in mining and manufacturing.   The denominator does not include 
groups of gainfully employed workers who typically were not subject to labor regulation:  
agricultural pursuits, domestic and personal service.  Railroad workers, street railroad workers, 
and professionals were affected by some of the labor regulations, so the use of only mining and 
manufacturing as the denominator overstates the spending per worker covered to some degree.
   
It turns out, however, that the relative ranking of states is generally the same when we try 
different groups of workers in the denominators.
21      19
The spending per worker serves as an index that simultaneously measures the coverage 
of the legislation and the extent to which it is enforced.  Enforcement is still imperfectly 
measured because enforcement of many safety regulations often relied on the courts so that 
violations might have been uncovered but not punished (see Fishback 2006; Graebner 1979).
22   
Complete bans or bright-line rules might also require little in the way of enforcement or 
administration because violations are so obvious.  Finally, regulations tend to involve a fixed 
cost of basic administration.  In states with regulation and small industrial workforces, the 
spending per worker measure might overstate the strength of the regulatory climate.   
The spending measure tells a somewhat different story than the page and law sum and 
index measures.   The correlations between time periods reported in Table 3 are weaker, as the 
correlation of the 1916 and 1903 measures are much lower at .49 than the correlations for any 
of the other measures in the Table.  The correlations between the measures for 1903 and 1909 
and again for 1909 and 1916 are also somewhat weaker at 0.74 and 0.78. 
The maps in Figure 5 and scatter plots in Figure 6 show many similarities to the 
comparisons for the other measures.  In general, high values of labor spending per worker were 
probably associated with more extensive labor regulation.  Massachusetts, New York, Indiana, 
Ohio, Colorado, Pennsylvania and Minnesota all rank relatively high as they did in the other 
rankings. 
A number of western states are scattered around the outer range of the scatter plot in 
Figure 6.  The locations came about through a combination of fixed costs of setting up labor 
regulations, small numbers of industrial workers, and generally better labor conditions in the 
west.   Most of the western states were relatively new to industrialization and had relatively 
small numbers of industrial workers.  To attract workers western employers tended to pay   20
higher wages.  Roughly 20 to 40 percent of the nonagricultural employment base in the 
western states was in mining, which was among the most dangerous of activities.  The 
employers’ desire to attract workers and to limit collective action by active western unions led 
them to support the adoption of mining and other regulations in territorial and state legislatures, 
a trend actively encouraged by reformers and unionized workers.  At the same time 
establishing and administering regulations required significant annual fixed costs and the hiring 
of inspectors often came in increments of $1000 to $2000.  Therefore, as the number of 
industrial workers in the West increased, the fixed costs of regulation were divided by an 
increasing number of workers, and the spending per worker declined.  This helps explain the 
declines in real spending associated with Colorado, North Dakota, Idaho, and Wyoming.  
Nevada, and Washington were relative latecomers to industrialization and thus by 1916 they 
may have been situated in the position where these other western states were sitting in the late 
1890s. 
West Virginia and Pennsylvania are similar to the western states in that mining, coal in 
this case, was a leading industry.  Coal miners accounted for a high percentage of the 
employment base in both states, higher in West Virginia.  Because West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania were further advanced in terms of employing miners and other industrial workers 
in 1903 and 1916, our sense is that the rise in spending per worker in Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia likely reflects more of an increase in intensity of labor regulation than it does for 
Nevada, and Washington. 
     
NONPARAMETRIC SPATIAL COORDINATES   21
Our measures thus far have been designed to try to capture the intensity of the 
regulatory climate.  The various measures each have advantages and disadvantages based on 
the weighting given to laws and allocation of spending.   The weightings have been explicitly 
designed and scholars may have alternative a priori interpretations of the regulations that 
would lead them to reweight the laws.    
Another route is to take an agnostic approach and use nonparametric methods to 
measure the similarities in portfolios of policy choice across states.   The method we use is a 
version of the Optimal Classification method that Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal have 
used to describe voting patterns in Congress.
23  The method is designed to establish coordinates 
in a “policy space” for which no explicit dimensions are established in advance.  The 
COORDINATE measures we develop essentially show which states have the combination of 
policies that look the most alike.  Since we have not pre-assigned any specific weighting 
scheme in advance, the COORDINATE measures can serve as a useful robustness check of the 
other measures.     
In other settings scholars have offered interpretations of what the dimensions of the 
policy space mean, similar to the way that social scientists have interpreted the factors that 
come out of factor analysis.   Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 1994, 1993, 1991), for example, use 
their spatial coordinates, called NOMINATEs, to show the degree to which Congressmen 
voted in similar ways on a large number of policy issues.  They found that after examination of 
voting patterns for a large number of issues that the similarities in voting patterns between 
Congressmen can be shown relatively effectively by two dimensional coordinates.  Although, 
their spatial coordinate method does not assign any interpretation to the vertical and horizontal 
measures, Poole and Rosenthal assigned ad hoc interpretations to the dimensions by comparing   22
the spatial locations to attributes of the Congressmen, the attributes of their constituents and the 
way people voted on a set of laws.     
Tomas Nonnenmacher (2002) has applied a nonparametric Binomial Unfolding 
technique, which is an updating of NOMINATE by Poole (2000, 2001), for a similar purpose 
to ours.  Nonnenmacher’s goal was to develop measures of location in policy space for the 
states based on the extent to which they adopted the laws collected by Jack Walker (1969) in 
his policy diffusion study.  As was the case in Poole and Rosenthal’s Congressional study, the 
spatial dimensions have no obvious interpretation from the data examined.  Nonnenmacher 
applies interpretations to the relative rankings based on the extent to which they are correlated 
with socio-economic measures.    
  We estimated two COORDINATEs for each state in each year.  In the sample for 
estimation we treated each state in each year as a separate observation and included an 
observation for each state for each year from 1896 through 1924.  By performing the 
estimation in this way we developed COORDINATE measures that allowed comparisons both 
across states within the same year and also comparisons of the policy choices across time.  For 
example, by pooling the data and treating Connecticut in 1896 as a separate observation from 
Connecticut in 1924, the COORDINATE measures could be used to compare the location of 
Connecticut in 1896 to another state like West Virginia in 1896 but also to Connecticut in 1924 
or Virginia in 1920.
24   
  The changes over time in the two COORDINATE coordinates are shown in the maps in 
Figures 7 and 8 and in the scatter plots in Figure 9.   As is the case with factor analysis and the 
Congressional voting analysis, there is no obvious interpretation of the dimensions of the 
coordinates without adding extra information.   Some insights can be gained by examining the   23
correlations with various types of laws.  The COORDINATE ONE coordinate, the vertical 
coordinate in Figure 9 seems to be strongly associated with factory regulations, while 
COORDINATE TWO appears to be strongly associated with mining regulations.  The raw 
correlations between the COORDINATE ONE measure and the subcategory estimate for 
factory regulations is 0.81, while the correlation with the mining subcategory is -0.01.  
Meanwhile, the correlation of COORDINATE TWO with the mining regulations subcategory 
is 0.63 compared with -0.25 for its correlation with factory regulations.    We can see these 
patterns in the maps in Figures 7 and 8.  COORDINATE ONE  has higher values primarily in 
manufacturing states in New England in the Midwest, while COORDINATE TWO has higher 
values mostly in states known for mining.   
 
IV.  Correlations Between the Measures 
Each of the measures can be considered to be summary measures in their own right, yet 
to some extent they measure different aspects of regulation as well.  The relationships between 
the measures are shown in Tables 3 and 4.  The cross-sectional correlations in Table 3 show 
the relationships in 1903, 1909, and again in 1919 between the stock of laws (level of 
spending), in essence, a snapshot of the entire body of state codes at a point in time.  The same 
general patterns (with some minor exceptions) of correlation are present in all three years.  In 
all three years relatively strong positive correlations above 0.61 can be found between the 
levels of the ESWI, the Page Counts, and the COORDINATE ONE measures.   Labor 
Spending has positive but somewhat weaker correlations with those three measures; between 
0.3 and 0.5 with the ESW Index, between 0.2 and 0.39 with the pages and 0.098 to 0.309 with 
the COORDINATE ONE.  The COORDINATE TWO measure, which appears more focused   24
on mining, has consistent correlations with labor spending per worker that ranges between 0.38 
and 0.42.  It has positive and weaker correlations with the number of pages, 0.23 to 0.31 and 
with the ESWI, 0.12 to 0.22, is also positively correlated.   
The changes in the measures of the legal climate arise due to the new legislation 
enacted between time periods.  Table 4 offers correlations across states for the change over the 
entire period from around 1900 to around 1919, and then separately for each of the two 
decades.  The correlations of changes in the ESWI, labor spending per worker, COORDINATE 
ONE, and COORDINATE TWO for entire period from around 1900 to around 1919 range 
between .11 and .53 with the weakest correlation between COORDINATE ONE and labor 
spending per worker.   Most of the strength of the correlations comes from the period 1909 to 
around 1919 because the correlations for that period are relatively close to those for the entire 
1900 to 1919 period.  The correlations from around 1900 to 1909 are much weaker.   
   
NATIONAL CHANGES 
The regulatory rise was a nation-wide phenomenon.  In every scatter plot comparison 
of 1899 and 1919 nearly every state lies above the 45 degree line, which implies that the 
regulation measure has grown over time.  Similarly, the maps for the regulatory measures all 
show a darkening over time for nearly every state.   The national rise can also be seen when we 
aggregate the measures for the entire United States in Figure 10.  We developed the national 
ESWI by weighting each of the state ESWI’s in that year by that state’s share of national 
employment in that year.
25  The national labor spending per worker measure was developed by 
the labor spending measure and then dividing by the national total of mining and 
manufacturing workers.     25
The national ESWI  displays an 0.2 rise in the extent of regulation from 1900 through 
1924 from a weighted index of 0.31 in 1899 to over 0.51 in 1924.  There was a relatively sharp 
rise between 1899 and 1903 and then the trend was relatively flat with a dip in 1908.  Between 
1908 and 1914 there was a substantial rise in the index from about .35 to about .47 that 
coincided with the introduction of many employer liability and workers’ compensation laws.  
The trend stayed relatively flat through the end of World War I, followed by a rise to around 
0.51 in the aftermath of the War. 
Meanwhile labor spending per mining and manufacturing worker in 1967 dollars  rose 
by roughly 8 cents between 1903 and 1905, stayed flat for several years, and then spiked by 
nearly 10 cents in 1908.  The spending stayed flat another two years and then rose by nearly 60 
cents between 1910 and 1915 with the wave of increased resources for inspection, the 
introduction of  commissions to operate workers’ compensation, and the expansion in a few 
states into Industrial Commissions that had their own rule-making authority.  We have not yet 
collected information for all states for the period 1917 through 1920, but the information for 
the states for which we have collected data suggests that labor spending per worker in 1967 
dollars declined.  Increases in nominal labor spending were more than outpaced by the 
doubling of the consumer prices during that time period.   
 
CORRELATES OF THE LABOR REGULATORY CLIMATE 
The overall labor regulatory climate was the result of an accumulation of a broad range 
of policy choices in each state.  The adoption of each labor law was the result of a series of 
proposals, counter proposals, negotiations, and compromises between the specific interest 
groups interested in those laws, the legislators, the governor, and voters, directly when the   26
legislation was voted on in a referendum or indirectly through their representatives.   At the 
same time many of the stances chosen on specific forms of regulation were part of broader 
agendas for the major interest groups, employers, unions, nonunion workers, and political 
parties.   Our goal in this section is to show the fundamental correlations between the labor 
climate and politics and economic interest groups.  We do this in two ways.  First, we examine 
cross-sectional correlations that show the long run relationships between these factors and the 
stock of laws circa 1903/1904 near the beginning of the period of measurement and again in 
1919.  Second we examine the factors that influenced the changes in those laws in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. 
Table 5 shows the relationship between various measures of the stock of  regulation and 
a series of political party and economic variables commonly seen as correlates of measures of 
labor legislation in 1904 and in 1919.
26   We have tried a variety of cross-sectional analyses 
using different time periods, and the results are not dramatically different from those reported 
here.   
The political party variables are the percentage of the population voting in presidential 
elections for the Republican presidential candidate, voting for the Socialist candidate, and 
voting for the 1912 Progressive Party candidate.  We focus more on presidential voting 
because the stances taken by the candidates were on nationwide platforms and thus broadly 
consistent from state to state.  The Democratic and Republican parties’ positions in state 
politics often varied to some degree across states, particularly when comparing southern 
Democrats to Democrats in the rest of the country.  Generally, Democrats outside the South, 
Progressives, and Socialists have been considered to have been more in tune with the interest 
of unions and workers than were Republicans, so we have incorporated a Democratic governor   27
variable.   Since nearly all southern Governors were Democrats, the South region dummy 
variable that we included and discuss later serves partly as an interaction term between the 
South and Democratic Governor.   
 We have also incorporated a series of variables that are broadly descriptive of the clout 
of major interest groups.  An index of unionization shows the extent to which workers in the 
state are employed in industries where unions had a stronger nationwide presence.   The size of 
the labor force and the percentages working in mining, manufacturing, and agriculture give a 
sense of the industrial structure of the states.   Generally, agricultural states were expected to 
be more likely to be opposed to labor regulation, even though agricultural workers were 
typically exempted from the rules.  There was a fear that the rules might be extended to 
agriculture in the future and that better workplaces would make it harder to keep workers from 
leaving agriculture for industrial jobs.  The relative importance of large and small firms in 
manufacturing are measured by the percentage of manufacturing establishments with fewer 
than 20 workers and the percentage with more than 500 workers.    We include the percentage 
foreign-born, black, and illiterate to examine the extent to which their relative lack of political 
clout and antipathy toward their presence influenced the labor regulation climate.  Finally, to 
examine whether the southern legacy of slavery had additional impact on the choice of labor 
regulation above and beyond the political and economic factors we have incorporated a dummy 
variable for the Southern states that had been members of the Confederacy.
27      
The results from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions summarized in Tables 5 
and 6 show the relationship of each of the major variables with the stock of the laws and level 
of labor spending per worker at the turn of the 20
th century and just after World War I, holding 
the other correlates constant.  The Tables report one-standard-deviation (OSD) relationships   28
that show how many standard deviations the labor regulation measure changes in response to a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the correlate.  The t-statistic for the coefficient estimate is 
reported below each OSD measure.   In the case of dummy variables we report the coefficient.   
To avoid simultaneity between the correlates and labor regulation measure in the same year, 
the values for the correlates with the labor climate in 1904 are from the years 1900 and 1899 
and the values for correlates for the later year are from the period around 1910 and 1912.   We 
have also run the analysis with just the political variables and just the economic variables, and 
the basic results reported here for each of the factors are similar to the findings in those 
analyses. 
The overall size of the gainfully employed has a positive effect on both the ESWI and 
the labor spending measure that strengthened over time.   An increase of one standard 
deviation in the size of the labor force was associated with an increase of 0.166 standard 
deviations in the ESWI in 1904 and 0.324 standard deviations in 1919.   The OSD relationships 
for the labor spending measure were 0.277 in 1904 and 0.286 in 1916.   The positive 
relationship between the labor force and regulation might arise because of the presence of 
substantial fixed costs of setting up and maintaining a regulatory regime.  Regulations that 
have large public good effects are more likely to be established because so many more workers 
benefit relative to the costs of establishing the regulation.
28   
A higher share of gainfully employed in agriculture was associated with substantially 
less regulation as measured by the ESWI but displayed virtually no relationship with the labor 
spending measure.
29   An OSD rise in the percent of the gainfully employed in agriculture was 
associated with a -0.731 standard deviation reduction in the ESWI in 1904 and a -0.791 
reduction in 1919.  Only the second relationship is estimated precisely enough that it is   29
statistically significant in a two-tailed test at the 10 percent level.
30  The farmers’ antipathy 
toward regulation was shown not only by their success in ensuring that labor regulations were 
not applied to farming in many cases, but also the reduced degree of labor regulation in farm 
states.  Once the regulations were established, however, the farmers did not appear to display 
much opposition to labor spending per worker in the nonagricultural fields.  The OSD 
relationships with labor spending were both positive and imprecisely estimated.     
In contrast, the share of workers in mining had a positive relationship with labor 
spending per mining and manufacturing worker.  The dangers of the mines contributed to more 
extensive safety regulations in mines and a larger ratio of inspectors to workers in mining and 
in manufacturing.  The OSD relationship was 0.916 for 1904 and 0.43 in 1919, although the 
latter was imprecisely estimated, and the hypothesis of no effect can not be rejected at the 10-
percent level.        
A number of scholars have suggested that large firms often contributed to the adoption 
of labor regulation, while workers and unions had a more mixed attitude toward regulation, 
particularly before 1910, because they feared that employers had enough clout in state 
legislatures to control the regulations.
31  The results here appear consistent with this description 
for the period around 1904, less so for 1919.   If unions favored regulation, we would expect to 
see strong positive relationships between the regulation measures and the union index.
32   The 
OSD relationships in states with a larger share of workers in industries with strong national 
unions are relatively small and positive in 1904 relative to most other effects in 1904, and they 
are not statistically significant.     Large firms in manufacturing, on the other hand, displayed a 
strong positive relationship with regulation.  The OSD relationships of the share of 
establishments with more than 500 workers were 0.549 and 0.705, respectively.     30
Given the controls for unionization and large manufacturing firms, the share of 
gainfully employed workers in manufacturing might be considered a measure of the political 
clout of either nonunion workers as voters or the overall weight of manufacturing employers 
and workers in the state.  The share of manufacturing workers has very strong negative OSD 
relationships with the measures of labor regulation in 1904.  A one standard deviation increase 
in the percent of workers in manufacturing was associated with an ESWI that was -0.873 
standard deviations lower and a labor spending measure that was -0.557 lower, although only 
the former relationship is precisely estimated.  The combination of findings for unions, large 
employers, and manufacturing suggest an important role for large manufacturing employers as 
early progenitors of regulation.  By 1919, however, the relationships had weakened 
considerably in magnitude and were no longer precisely estimated.      
  The political party, Democratic governor, and the South dummy generally do not 
show consistently strong relationships with the stock of labor legislation at the two points in 
time.   None of the political coefficients were precisely estimated and we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of no effect in two-tailed tests at the 10-percent level.  States with more voting for 
Socialist presidential candidates were more likely to have more regulation and more labor 
spending with OSD relationships of 0.166 and 0.272 in 1904, and similar effects in later years.   
Progressive presidential votes in 1912 were slightly negatively associated with labor 
regulation.  Meanwhile, Republican voting states had fewer laws but greater spending per 
worker in both years.      These results fit with findings that Taft, Wilson, and Roosevelt all 
included a number of progressive planks related to labor in their political agendas.   
States with Democratic governors show no strong association one way or the other with 
the state labor climates.  The largest OSD relationships for the Democratic Governors were   31
negative for the ESWI in 1904 and higher for the labor spending measure in 1919.   Southern 
states in both periods were more likely to have lower labor spending per mining and 
manufacturing worker with OSD relationships of -0.654.  They appeared to have similar levels 
of the ESWI in 1904 but -0.309 standard deviation lower levels in 1919.  Thus, after 
controlling for other economic features, the southern legacy appears to be more laws and less 
labor spending per worker in 1904, and less of both in 1919.   Although here again, the 
coefficients are all imprecisely estimated.   
 Since the stock of legislation was the accumulation of a large number of laws that may 
have been passed between one to thirty years earlier, we also examine the relationships 
between the correlates and the change in labor legislation within the decade.  Table 6 shows the 
OSD effects from regressions with two observations for nearly every state, the change in labor 
legislation or labor spending per worker in the first decade of the 1900s and the changes in the 
second decade.    The correlates are measures of the situation at the beginning of each decade 
in most cases.  The exceptions are measures of the number of changes in the political party of 
the governor and the party in power in the houses of the state legislature during the decade.  
These were included because studies by Fishback and Kantor (2000) and Pavalko (1989) both 
found effects of party power shifts on the adoption of workers’ compensation.    
Estimates are reported for regressions with and without fixed effects for the states and 
the timing.  The state fixed effects are dummy variables for all states except Connecticut that 
are used to control for unmeasured factors that do not change over time within the same state 
but vary across states over time.  These would include long-term political and economic 
features of the state that are unchanging over time, as well as the physical terrain of the state.  
The Second Decade year effect is a dummy variable for the observations on changes in labor   32
regulation for the second decade of the 1900s.  The dummy acts as a control for unmeasured 
nationwide factors that affected all states, including World War I or a national recession.    The 
OSD effects in the estimations incorporating fixed effects are similar to estimating the average 
difference-in-difference relationship across states.  In essence, we are seeing, on average, how 
differences in the correlates within the states influence differences in the changes in the state 
labor climate.   
The main result that comes out of the analysis is the finding that the changes in the 
labor measure have a strong negative relationship with the prior stock of labor legislation or the 
prior level of labor spending.   States with ESWI laws at the beginning of the period that are 
one standard deviation higher, experience changes in labor legislation that is -0.634 standard 
deviations lower in the absence of fixed effects and       -1.953 standard deviations lower when 
fixed effects are incorporated.  The OSD effects are smaller for the labor spending per worker 
at -0.298 without fixed effects and -0.762 with fixed effects.  The results suggest that there tend 
to be a reasonably strong catch-up effects in labor legislation.  Other states eventually join the 
early adopting states in adopting many forms of labor legislation.  In the fixed effects analysis, 
states with a larger share of large firms are more likely to adopt new legislation although not 
necessarily to increase spending per worker.      
Most of the strong effects found when fixed effects are not incorporated in the analysis 
are weakened or reversed with the inclusion of fixed effects.  This includes the positive 
relationships for the share of the population voting Socialist for president for both labor 
measures.  For labor spending per worker, the positive relationships are reversed for the mining 
share and the agricultural share, the percent foreign-born, and diminished sharply for the 
number of changes in the party in charge of the lower house of the legislature.     33
In the fixed effects analysis there were sizeable OSD relationships between the labor 
measures and the number of gainfully employed workers and the percent black  (OSDs over 1 
for both).  Large firms had a strong positive OSD relationship with the ESWI at 0.81, as did 
Democratic Governors at 0.676.  Collective action had mixed effects.  Increased strike activity 
during the decade was associated with over 0.6 OSD relationships with both measures.  
Meanwhile, the unionization index showed both a positive relationship with the ESWI and a 
negative relationship with the spending measures.  In all of these cases, some care must be 
exercised in drawing conclusions due to the imprecision of the estimation shown by the low 
absolute values of the t-statistics.    
The fixed effects show the effects of unmeasured factors related to the states that 
influenced the choice of labor legislation.  The states that ranked in the top 10 in unmeasured 
factors that were positively related to larger increases in the ESWI, include, in order from the 
top, the western and Midwestern states of Colorado, Montana, Nevada, Idaho, Utah, 
Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Iowa.   The bottom ten were generally in the 
South and the Mid-Atlantic, including from bottom South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Virginia, North Carolina, Texas, and New York.    
The states that ranked in the top 10 in unmeasured factors that were positively related to 
larger increases in labor regulation spending per worker, include, in order from the top, the 
mostly western states of North Dakota, Idaho, South Dakota, Nevada, Montana, New Mexico, 
Arizona, West Virginia, Minnesota, and Colorado.  The bottom ten were again generally in the 
South and the Mid-Atlantic, including from bottom Mississippi, South Carolina, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Florida, Alabama, Virginia,New York, North Carolina, and Maryland.     34
Note that these estimates are effects estimated after controlling for the size of the labor 
force, the shares of mining, agriculture, firm sizes, industrial mix related to unionization, and 
many political factors.  The results for the changes in laws thus suggest a stronger negative role 
for the unmeasured Southern Legacy than the results for the stock of laws.   The results also 
leave a great deal of room for the important type of institutional analysis traditionally 
performed in narrative labor and business histories. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
  The regulatory climate in the labor arena during the progressive era was marked by 
both great breadth and complexity.  In the search for understanding about the inter-
relationships between labor markets, politics, and labor regulation we need both summary 
measures as well as studies in-depth of the institutions.   The summary measures allow people 
to make broad comparisons of the overall labor regulation across states and how these changed 
over time.  There is no doubt that they can be improved by going into more depth on each type 
of regulation.  Suggestions for improvement, particularly when accompanied by new 
information that will improve the measures, are welcome.   
Further, we can use the measures to perform rudimentary statistical analysis of the 
interactions of these factors.  The brief analysis of the correlates of the stock of labor regulation 
and the changes in labor regulation show several important relationships that appear after 
holding other factors constant.   The extent of labor regulation was related to the overall size of 
the labor force.  States with larger establishments tended to have more regulation early on and 
were more likely to adopt changes in labor legislation.   States with industries with a strong 
national union presence do not seem to be associated positively or negatively with the   35
regulatory climate.   States that lagged behind the early adopters tended to eventually catch-up 
and adopt many forms of labor regulation.  Finally, southern states were typically at the bottom 
of the list in terms of making changes in their regulations.   
The results of the analysis also show that the statistical studies can only carry us part of 
the way toward understanding the development of labor regulation.   Hidden in the fixed 
effects in the statistical analysis are many factors in the states that are not necessarily easily 
measured quantitatively.   Careful analysis of both statistical and narrative evidence is 
important for understanding the relationships between labor regulations and the society.  Our 
hope is that scholars of all types find these summary measures useful for comparative purposes 
in their own work.   
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Table 1 
Years of Introduction of Labor Commission, Factory Inspectors, Departments of Labor, 


























            
Alabama   1907 
a   1907 
a     1919  1891 
Arizona   1925 
b 
b 1925  Few  1913  no coal 
Arkansas   1913 
c    1939  1889 
California   1883  1885  1913  extensive  1911  no coal 
Colorado   1887  1911  1915  no codes  1915  1883 
Connecticut   1887  1887      1913  no coal 
Delaware   1893  1893      1917  no coal 
Florida   1893 
d  
e    1935  no coal 
Georgia   1911  1916      1920  no coal 
Idaho   1890 
f 
g 1917  no  codes  1917  no coal 
Illinois   1879  1893      1911  1872 
Indiana   1879  1899      1915  1879 
Iowa   1884  1897      1913  1873 
Kansas   1885  1901      1911  1883 
Kentucky   1892 
h 1903      1914  1884 
Louisiana   1900  1908      1914  no coal 
Maine   1887  1887      1915  no coal 
Maryland   1888 
i 1898  1928  no  codes  1912  1876 
Massachusetts   1869  1879  1913  extensive  1911  no coal 
Michigan   1883  1893      1912  1887 
Minnesota   1887 
j 1891      1913  no coal 
Mississippi   1914  1914      1948  no coal 
Missouri   1879  1891 
k     1926  1881 
Montana   1893 
l 
l 
m 1915  no  codes  1915  1889 
Nebraska   1887 
n 1895 
n 1929  no  codes  1913 no coal 
Nevada   1915  1915  1919  Few  1913  no coal 
New 
Hampshire  
1893 1917  1917  no  codes  1911  no coal 
New Jersey   1877  1878      1911  no coal 
New Mexico  
o 
o    1917  1891 




e 1931   1929  no coal 
North Dakota   1899  1905  1919  no codes  1919  1905 
Ohio   1877  1884  1913  extensive  1911  1874 
Oklahoma   1907  1910      1915  1891 
Oregon   1903  1907  1920  few  1913  no coal 
Pennsylvania   1872  1889  1913 for 
mines only 




Rhode Island   1887  1894      1912  no coal 
South 
Carolina  
1912 1912      1935  no coal 
South Dakota   1890 
p    1917  no coal 
Tennessee   1881-84 
q 
1897 
r 1923  few  1919  1881 
Texas   1911  1911      1913  1907 
Utah   1892 
s 1917  1917  extensive  1917  1896 
Vermont   1912  1912      1915  no coal 
Virginia   1897  1919      1918  1912 
Washington   1903  1910  1919  few  1911  1883 
West Virginia   1890 
t 1899 
r     1913  1883 
Wisconsin   1883  1883  1911  extensive  1911  no coal 
Wyoming   1917  1917      1915  1886 
                    
  
Sources:  First Labor Bureau refers to the introduction of either a commissioner of labor, a bureau of 
labor statistics, or a factory inspector.  Factory inspection adopted refers to the first statutory provision 
for a factory inspector.  For dates of adoption of inspectors and departments of labor I started with 
evidence from Brandeis (1935, pp. 628-645) and the U.S. Commissioner of Labor (1896).   When the 
precise date of introduction was unknown, the microfiche for the State Session Laws of American 
States and Territories was searched until the original act was found.  The earliest commissioner of labor 
was in Massachusetts in 1869 and the earliest factory inspector was in Massachusetts in 1879.   
Information on workers and establishments for 1880 is from the Report on Manufacturing for the 
Eleventh Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 1895, pp.  67-69).  Information on Industrial Commissions is 
from Brandeis (1935, p. 654), who was citing work of John Andrews of the American Association of 
Labor Legislation.   The information on the adoption of workers’ compensation is from Fishback and 
Kantor (2000, pp. 103-4).  Information that was not available is marked as n.a.  Year of coal law 
adoption is from Aldrich (1997, p. 70).   
 
aAlabama had a mine inspector and later a board of arbitration but no official department of 
labor. 
bArizona had a mine inspector as of 1908. 
cArkansas had an inspector of mines in 1894 or earlier. 
dThe Florida Agriculture department was given the responsibility to collect statistics on 
manufactures.   
eNo law as of 1924.   38
fIdaho established commission in Constitution.  No record of laws passed between 1879 and 
1890. 
gIdaho had an inspector of mines in 1893 or earlier. 
hThe Kentucky commissioner was to devote efforts to collect statistics on agriculture, 
manufacturing and mining.  
iThe initial Maryland law in 1868 was for agriculture and industry with most of the focus on 
agriculture.  The code of 1888 with amendments in 1892 is more specific to industry. 
jThe Minnesota law included language about enforcing laws and prosecuting violations by the 
commissioner but only funds for the commissioner were provided. 
kMissouri statute for inspector in 1891.  Not found in earlier years. 
l The Montana act established a bureau of agriculture, labor, and industry.   
mMontana had a mine inspector in 1895 or earlier. 
nNebraska gave the commissioner the power to inspect workplaces. 
oNew Mexico had a mine inspector as of 1908. 
pSouth Dakota had a mine inspector as of 1903. 
qThe Tennessee Law called for the Bureau of Agriculture, Mining, and Statistics to collect 
information on labor.  The original Bureau of Agriculture was established in 1871, became the Bureau 
of Agriculture, Mining, and Statistics in 1875, but appears to have obtained the role of collecting labor 
statistics sometime between 1881 and 1884.  We have had trouble pinning down the date.  
rIn Tennessee and West Virginia there were no regular inspectors.  Commissioner merely had 
the power to inspect. 
sThe Utah legislature had authorized a bureau of labor statistics or labor department earlier. 
tWest Virginia gave the commissioner the power to inspect workplaces but only to report on 
findings there. 
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Table 2 












ESW Index 1899  1       
ESW Index 1909  0.8322  1     
ESW Index 1919  0.7257  0.8618  1   







Pages 1904  1     
Pages 1907  0.9813  1   
Pages 1914  0.9098  0.9339  1 

















Labor Spending per Worker, 
1903 
1     
Labor Spending per Worker 
1909 
0.7458 1     
Labor Spending per Worker 
1916 











COORD ONE 1899  1       
COORD ONE 1909  0.8099  1     
COORD ONE 1919  0.76  0.7399  1   











COORD TWO 1899  1       
COORD TWO 1909  0.8503  1     
COORD TWO 1919  0.7227  0.8743  1   
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Table 3 


















ESW Index 1899  1         
Pages 1904  0.7277  1       
Labor Spending per Mining and 
Manufacturing Worker 1903 
0.4784 0.3831  1     
COORD ONE 1899  0.8338  0.7946  0.3094  1   
COORD TWO 1899  0.2193  0.3112  0.3831  0.1134  1 

















ESW Index 1909  1         
Pages 1907  0.6327  1       
Labor Spending per Mining and 
Manufacturing Worker 1909 
0.3537 
 
0.2163 1     
COORD ONE 1909  0.7684  0.7297  0.0977  1   
COORD TWO 1909  0.1767  0.2322  0.3827  0.0314  1 
















ESW Index 1919  1         
Labor Spending per Mining and 
Manufacturing Worker 1916 
0.4907 1       
COORD ONE 1919  0.8295  0.2754  1     
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Table 4 




















ESW Index 1919-1899  1       
Labor Spending per 
Manufacturing and Mining 
Worker 1916-1903 
0.5309 1     
COORD ONE 1919-1899  0.4622  0.1125  1   
COORD TWO 1919-1899  0.3684  0.4319  0.3331  1 



















ESW Index 1919-1909  1       
Labor Spending per 
Manufacturing and Mining 
Worker 1916-1909 
0.2645 1     
COORD ONE 1919-1909  0.5537  0.1125  1   
COORD TWO 1919-1909  0.245  0.4319  0.3149  1 



















ESW Index 1909-1899  1       
Labor Spending per 
Manufacturing and Mining 
Worker 1909-1903 
0.2776 1     
COORD ONE 1909-1899  0.2368  -0.0702  1   
COORD TWO 1909-1899  0.1188  0.3347  -0.0363  1 
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Table 5 
One Standard Deviation Effects of Correlates on Stock of Labor Legislation and Labor 
Spending per Mining and Manufacturing Worker (1967$) 
(t-statistics of Coefficients in Italics Below OSD Effects) 























0.124 0.131 6.5 -0.097 -0.016 8.5 Unionization Index, 1899 
0.75 0.76  2.9
Unionization Index, 
1909  -0.54 -0.06 3.5
-0.388 0.267 48.2 -0.023 0.425 46.5 % Voting Republican for 
President, 1900  -1.36 0.64  14.2
% Voting Republican 
for President, 1912  -0.08 1.34  14.8
0.166 0.272 0.5 0.128 0.337 6.0 % Voting Socialist for 
President, 1900  1.03 1.33  0.6
% Voting Socialist for 
President, 1912  0.54 1.22  4.2
     -0.070 -0.170 24.5  
    
% Voting Progressive 
Party for President, 
1912   -0.41 -1.08  10.3
0.264 0.277 559090 0.324 0.286 716988 Number of Gainfully 
Employed, 1900  2.19 1.68  568534
Number of Gainfully 
Employed, 1910  2.4 2.4  701803
-0.060 0.087 71.3 0.075 -0.002 75.2 % of Manu. Estabs. With 
fewer than 20 workers, 
1899 
-0.28 0.36  6.5
% of Manu. Estabs. 
With fewer than 20 
workers, 1909 
0.28 -0.01 5.5
0.549 0.705 0.4 0.274 0.114 0.6 % of Manu. Estabs. With 
More than 500 workers, 
1899  1.94 2.14  0.4
% of Manu. Estabs. 
With More than 500 
workers, 1909  0.98 0.47  0.5
-0.606 0.387 11.2 -0.179 0.512 10.6 % black, 1900 
-0.92 0.48  17.4
% black, 1910 
-0.57 1.75  16.4
-0.300 0.040 14.0 -0.001 0.214 14.0 % foreign born, 1900 
-1.43 0.19  10.2
% foreign born, 1910 
-0.01 0.98  10.1
-0.216 -0.546 11.9 -0.219 -0.322 8.4 % Illiterate, 1900 
-0.32 -0.69  10.8
% Illiterate, 1910 
-0.83 -1.42 7.3
-0.731 0.429 39.4 -0.791 0.057 37.3 % of Gainfully Employed 
in Agriculture, 1900 
-1.3 0.57  18.9
% of Gainfully 
Employed in 
Agriculture, 1910  -1.77 0.11  19.1
0.131 0.916 2.8 -0.183 0.430 3.4 % of Gainfully Employed 
in Mining, 1900 
0.66 3.11  4.5
% of Gainfully 
Employed in Mining, 
1910  -0.84 1.39  4.8
-0.873 -0.557 22.6 -0.544 -0.278 24.9 % of Gainfully Employed 
in Manufacturing, 1900 
-1.77 -0.84  11.7
% of Gainfully 
Employed in 
Manufacturing, 1910  -0.99 -0.56  12.4
Dummy Variables             
-0.298 0.014 0.438 0.031 0.219 0.563 Governor is a Democrat, 
1900  -1 0.03  0.501
Governor is a 
Democrat, 1912  0.11 0.79  0.501
  0.105 -0.654 0.216 Southern State  -0.309 -0.640 0.216  43
Southern State  0.14 -1.13  0.415 -0.77 -1.2  0.415
7.064 -2.092   4.370 -0.675   Constant 
2.76 -0.65   
Constant 
0.89 -0.13   
0.676 0.593     0.625 0.672   Rsquared 
          
 
 
Notes.  The One-Standard Deviation (OSD) Effects for continuous variables show the number 
of standard deviations by which the dependent variable changes with respect to a one-standard-
deviation increase in the variable.  The OSD Effects for dummy variables show the number of 
standard deviations by which the dependent variable changes with respect to a move from zero 
to one of the dummy variable.  Robust t-statistics are presented in italics below the OSD 
Effects.  Means with Standard Deviations are reported for each of the Correlates to the right of 
the OSD Effects and the t-statistics.       
The dependent variables are the ESWI in 1904 and 1919 and Labor Spending (in 
$1967) per mining and manufacturing worker in 1904 and 1916.   For the ESWI in 1904 the 
mean is 0.24 and the standard deviation is 0.125, for the labor spending measure in 1904 the 
mean is 0.42 and standard deviation is 0.36.  For the ESWI in 1919 the mean is 0.35 and the 
standard deviation is 0.14, for the labor spending measure in 1916 the mean is 0.92 and 
standard deviation is 0.77.   
There are observations for all 48 states in the 1916 and 1919 regressions.  Arizona, 
New Mexico, and Oklahoma are missing from the 1904 regressions due to lack of presidential 
voting information in 1900.  The data sources are described in Fishback and Kantor (2000) and 
the data on all correlates were pulled from the workers’ compensation data sets on Price 
Fishback’s website at the University of Arizona Department of Economics:  
http://economics.eller.arizona.edu/faculty/Fishback.aspx.   44
Table 6 
One Standard Deviation Effects of Correlates on Changes in Labor Legislation and 
Changes in Labor Spending per Mining and Manufacturing Worker 
(t-statistics of Coefficients in Italics Below) 
 
  ESWI at End of 
Decade  
Labor Spending 
per Mining and 
Manufacturing 
Worker at End of 














-0.634 -1.953    0.23  0.13 ESWI at Beginning of Decade 
-3.05 -4.71        
   -0.298 -0.762 0.51  0.47 Labor Spending per Mining and 
Manufacturing Worker ($1967) 
at Start of Decade  
   -2.45  -1.76    
-0.239 -0.757 0.091 0.294 47.3 14.4 % Voting Republican for 
President  -0.99  -1.34 0.46 0.37    
0.206 -0.137 0.339 -0.196 3.3 4.1 % Voting Socialist for President 
1.33 -0.36  2.18 -0.49    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 11.9 14.2 % Voting Progressive for 
President  0.42  0.23 -0.36 -1.06    
0.148 1.067 0.037 1.353 638039 640222 Number of Gainfully Employed 
Workers  0.47 1.02 0.14 1.15    
0.152 -0.037 -0.145 0.039 73.3 6.3 % of Manu. Estabs with fewer 
than 20 workers  0.95 -0.13 -1.05  0.14    
0.160 0.813 -0.187 -0.521 0.5 0.5 % of Manu. Estabs with More 
than 500 workers 
0.69  1.29 -0.83 -0.85    
-0.427 -1.490 0.689 -2.920 38.3 18.9 % of Gainfully Employed in 
Agriculture  -0.98 -0.72  1.89 -1.24    
-0.067 -0.692 0.509 -0.286 3.1 4.6 % of Gainfully Employed in 
Mining 
-0.46 -1.41  3.36 -0.39    
-0.204 -0.415 0.363 -1.127 23.7 12.1 % of Gainfully Employed in 
Manufacturing 
-0.42 -0.47  1.06  -0.8    
-0.097 0.231 -0.038 -0.336 7.5 3.4 Unionization Index 
-0.59  0.85 -0.23 -0.77    
-0.364 3.570 0.143 5.997 10.9 16.8 % Black 
-1.26 0.78 0.56 1.22    
0.009 0.057 0.389 0.178 14.0 10.1 % Foreign-Born 
0.07 0.05 2.01 0.16    
 0.107 0.673 0.242 0.624 62.5  111.5  45
Average Number of Strikes in 
Decade 
0.35 0.45 0.79 0.46    
0.211 0.676 -0.091 0.003 0.427 0.497 Governor is Democrat at start of 
decade  0.83 1.38 -0.3  0    
-0.046 0.062 0.010 -0.211 1.354 1.046 Number of Changes of Party of 
Governor in Decade 
-0.46 0.27  0.1  -0.86    
0.047 -0.270 -0.024 -0.063 0.740 1.215 Number of Changes in Party 
Control of Upper House of 
Legislature in Decade 
0.32 -0.86 -0.23 -0.36    
-0.014 -0.111 0.296 0.301 0.834 1.382 Number of Changes in Party 
Control of Lower House of 
Legislature in Decade 
-0.17  -0.47 2.87 1.35    
-0.626 -0.078 0.216 0.413 Southern State 
-1.23   -0.17     
 0.783  1.977     Second Decade Dummy 
 0.42   1.01    
2.472 6.652 -1.104 5.684    Constant 
0.89 0.71  -0.56 0.56    
R-Squared  0.31  0.5 0.34 0.87    
State Effects   Included   Included    
ME   3.103   0.762    
   1.24   0.31    
MA   -0.580   -1.915    
   -0.23   -0.88    
NH   2.296   1.349    
   1.29   0.95    
RI   -2.007   0.241    
   -1.31    0.24    
VT   2.564   1.373    
   0.75   0.44    
DE   -3.346   -5.148    
   -0.61   -0.82    
NJ   -1.915   -3.583    
   -0.98   -1.78    
NY   -4.577   -9.873    
   -0.51   -1.37    
PA   -2.851   -5.088    
   -0.51   -1.07    
IL   -1.332   -3.754    
   -0.36   -1.17    
IN   3.238   0.003    
   0.84    0    
MI   3.989   -0.230    
   1.49    -0.09    
            46
OH   0.650   -1.396    
   0.16   -0.4    
WI   3.924   1.048    
   1.52   0.43    
IO   3.433   0.939    
   0.91   0.25    
KS   3.519   1.652    
   0.91   0.38    
MN   4.349   2.961    
   1.68   1.11    
MO   0.252   -2.047    
   0.06    -0.49    
NE   2.528   2.307    
   0.84   0.61    
ND   3.069   6.729    
   0.74   1.56    
SD   1.585   4.943    
   0.4    1.16    
VA   -7.782   -10.638    
   -0.8    -0.89    
AL   -10.343   -11.402    
   -0.84   -0.72    
AR   -4.476   -5.942    
   -0.5    -0.51    
FL   -11.287   -12.933    
   -0.91   -0.92    
GA   -10.885   -14.059    
   -0.84   -0.87    
LA   -8.564   -13.907    
   -0.68   -0.89    
MS   -13.167   -16.015    
   -0.81   -0.79    
NC   -5.788   -8.227    
   -0.61   -0.68    
SC   -13.524   -14.811    
   -0.87   -0.75    
TX   -4.600   -4.891    
   -0.69   -0.54    
KY   -1.496   -1.569    
   -0.28   -0.24    
MD   -2.979   -6.487    
   -0.52   -0.97    
OK   2.407   2.178    
   0.44   0.34    
TN   -3.405   -5.158    
   -0.46   -0.54      47
WV   3.051   3.654    
   0.66   0.66    
AZ   2.579   3.955    
   0.73    0.7    
CO   5.792   2.580    
   1.96   0.71    
ID   5.108   5.274    
   1.38    1.2    
MT   5.622   4.037    
   2.05   1.18    
NV   5.372   4.799    
   1.57   0.97    
NM   3.179   3.978    
   0.73   0.74    
UT   5.011   1.869    
   1.71   0.53    
WY   3.362   1.848    
   0.99   0.45    
CA   2.761   -2.282    
   1.27    -0.82    
OR   2.859   0.734    
   1.01   0.22    
WA   3.566   2.018    
   1.52   0.69    
 
 
Notes.  The numbers for continuous variables show the number of standard deviations by 
which the dependent variable changes with respect to a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
variable.  The numbers for dummy variables show the number of standard deviations by which 
the dependent variable changes with respect to a move from zero to one of the dummy 
variable.  Robust t-statistics, clustered by states are presented in italics below the numbers.   
The dependent variables are the change in the ESWI between 1899 and 1909 and again 
from 1909 to 1919 and the change in Labor Spending (in $1967) per mining and manufacturing 
worker between 1903 and 1909 and again from 1909 to 1916.   The means are .077 for the 
changes in the ESWI and .25 for the labor spending measure with standard deviations of .073 
and .43 respectively. 
There are two observations for each state except Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, 
which did not have presidential voting in the first period.  The values for most variables are 
from the beginning of the decade.  Presidential voting for the early observation is from 1900 
and from 1912 for the later observation.  The democratic governor variable is from 1900 and 
1909.  The manufacturing size variables are from 1899 and 1909, the gainful employment 
shares for mining, manufacturing, and agriculture are from 1900 and 1910.   The change in the 
governor and changes in party control of legislatures are for the periods 1900 to 1909 and 1910 
to 1919.  The data sources are described in Fishback and Kantor (2000) and the data are 
available from Price Fishback’s website at the University of Arizona Department of 






Figure 1  
State Map of the ESW Index, 
1999, 1909, 1914, 1919   49
Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Maps Showing Pages of Labor 
Legislation Reported by the 
Department of Labor    51
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
Maps of Labor Spending per 
Mining and Manufacturing 
Worker  in 1967 Dollars, 1903 
   53
 
Figure 6 
Scatter Plots of Labor Spending per Mining and Manufacturing Worker in 1967$, 
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Figure 7 




Maps of COORDINATE TWO   56
 
Figure 9 
Scatter Plots of COORDINATE ONE Against COORDINATE TWO,  
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Appendix Table 1 
Number of States with Each Type of Law, 1895, 1908, 1918, and 1924 
[This Table is substantially reorganized to match the ESWI categories and differs in 
organization from the table that appeared in Holmes, Fishback, and Allen 2008]  
WORKPLACE ACTIVITY REGULATION         
  Factory Safety       
    Sanitation/bathroom  regulations  11  22 34 35 
    Ventilation  10  22 25 26 
    Guards required on machines  12  22  34  35 
    Electrical  Regulations  0  0 6 8 
    Building  Regulations  5  13 23 24 
    Other  1  3 10 11 
    Bakery  Regulations  7  14 27 32 
    Sweatshop  Regulations  9  11 14 14 
    Fire  escapes  23  30 36 37 
    Factory  Inspector  15  29 39 41 
    Factory  accidents  10  14 22 23 
    Occupational  disease  reporting  1  1 16 17 
  Mining Regulations       
    Mine  inspectors  23  30 33 33 
   
Mine Safety Regulations:  Employees/Individuals  18  23  30  32 
    Mine Safety Regulations:  Companies  22  30  33  35 
    No screening/fine if not weight coal  14  21  22  23 
    Mine Inspector fined for not doing job  9  13  17  18 
    Miners' Hospital and or Home  4  5  5  5 
    No Women and Children in Mines  25  31  35  35 
    Mine accidents Reporting  19  26  33  32 
  Railroad Regulations       
    Safety  Regulations  20  32 45 45 
    Railroad  Inspectors  4  7 6 6 
    Railroad accidents reporting  3  21  36  39 
  Street Railroad safety regulations  7  28 30 30 
  Occupational Licensing       
    Railroad telegraph operators  3  1  1  2 
    Plumbers  9  19 22 23 
    Horseshoers  2  5 6 6 
    Chauffers  0  1 27 36 
    Aviators  0  0 2 6 
    Other  0  0 2 2 
    Motion Picture Operator  0  0  8  8 
    Barbers  1  13 16 16 
    Steam engineers (firemen)  11  16  17  17 
    Mine  manager  7  11 13 16 
    Elevator  operators  1  2 2 2 
    Railroad  employees  1  1 1 1 
    Electricians  0  1 2 4   59
    Stevedores  2  2 2 2 
HOURS REGULATION       
  Women's Hours       
    Night labor   3  4  11  13 
    General/All  Employment  2  6 24 28 
    Mercantile  3  8 24 27 
    Mechanical  12  16 25 28 
    Textiles  8  13 25 27 
  Child hours law       
    General  7  18 30 35 
    Mercantile  6  15 22 22 
    Mechanical  18  30 30 28 
    Textile  15  27 27 26 
    Other  2  8 10 10 
    Minimum Age for night labor for children  7  29  42  45 
 General  Hours  Laws       
    Textiles  6  6 6 6 
    Mines  5  13 15 15 
    Manufacture  7  7 8 9 
    Railroads  8  26 27 27 
    Street  Railroads  8  10 10 10 
    Public  Employment  14  22 29 30 
    Other  5  5 11 11 
    General Hours Law  13  12  11  11 
    Public  Roads  2  23 16 16 
    1 hr for meals  6  9  17  19 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN ACTIVITY REGULATION     
  Child Labor       
    Child safety commission  0  1  10  14 
    Child labor inspector  13  30  40  41 
   
Children in manufacture/mercantile/mechanical jobs  20  42  42  44 
    Minimum Age   17  33  40  42 
    Penalty for false certificate of age  16  36  38  38 
   
Certificates of Age required for employment  19  38  45  46 
   
Fine for children working to support idle parents.  1  7  7  7 
   
No children cleaning or handling moving parts  10  20  36  39 
   
No children in immoral jobs (acrobat)  Is this street 
jobs? 
25  30 34 34 
    No women and children in bars  6  23  5  6 
  Women's Regulation       
    Special accommodations (seats)  23  33  44  44 
    Earnings of married women belong to her  31  43  46  46 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION    
    Restates Common Law  15  28  23  21 
    General    21  47  48  47   60
    Railroads  16  31 32 32 
    Street  Railroads  1  8 7 7 
    Mines  1  4 4 4 
   
Can't require employees to sign contracts waiving 
damages  
14  25 28 28 
    Workers' Compensation Law  0  0  37  42 
STEAM BOILER INSPECTION  15  17 15 17 
UNIONIZATION AND BARGAINING       
 Pro-Union       
   
False use of union cards or employers' certificates  1  10  12  13 
    Incorporation of labor unions.  9  9  10  11 
   
Labor organizations exempt from antitrust  5  5  10  14 
   
Strikes:  Agreements not to work allowed  3  5  7  10 
   
Conspiracy vs. workmen (conspiring to prevent 
someone from working 
11  14 15 17 
    Labor agreement is not a conspiracy  6  8  8  10 
    No  blacklisting  14  23 25 25 
   
Yellow dog contract (Not allowed to join a union as a 
condition of employment) (illegal for anyone to coerce 
to join or not to join a union) 
11  16 12 12 
    Prohibition on hiring armed guards  17  12  9  9 
   
Misrepresentation about a strike or other job 
characteristics 
2  7 12 13 
    Limits on injunctions  0  1  4  8 
   
Labor organizations--embezzlement of funds by 
officers 
2  2 3 3 
   
Combinations of employers to fix wages illegal  0  1  0  0 
    Union trademark fine  25  42  43  44 
 Anti-Union       
    Enticement  fines  11  11 11 11 
   
Interfere with or intimidate in railroads or workers 
abandoning trains or obstructing track 
25  11 9 9 
    Interference with railroad employees  14  9  9  9 
   
Interference with street railroad employees  4  1  1  2 
    No intimidation of miners  4  6  7  7 
   
Illegal to interfere with a business or the employment of 
others 
15  16 19 21 
    Anti-picketing  0  2 2 6 
    Anti-boycott  3  7 5 5 
    Anti-intimidation  19  23 26 27 
    Industrial police are legal  1  9  19  22   61
   
Criminal Syndicalism (advocating violence or sabotage 
for political or industrial ends) 
0 0  7  19 
    No Trespass without employer consent  1  1  0  0 
BRIBERY, COERCION AND POLITICAL FREEDOMS      
   
Foreman accepting fees for employment  illegal  1  4 12 14 
    Bribing  Employees  0  13 17 17 
    Coercion of Employees is illegal  10  13  19  19 
    Company Stores Cannot Gouge  6  8  8  8 
    Coercing the votes of employees illegal  30  33  38  38 
    Time off to Vote  18  22  24  24 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS/DEPT. OF LABOR  28  34 43 44 
STATE BOARD OF ARBITRATION, MEDIATION   20  26 32 33 
REHABILITATION COMMISSION  0  0 0 4 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION  0 0  9  17 
FREE EMPLOYMENT OFFICES  0  14 23 32 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION       
    Cannot fire due to age only  0  1  1  1 
    Sex  discrimination  3  3 4 6 
    Antidiscrimination  1  1 1 1 
PAYDAY REGULATIONS       
    Nonpayment  1  1 3 4 
    Wages in cash   19  29  28  30 
    Wage payment frequency  20  26  32  37 
   
Repayment of advance made by employer  1  9  9  12 
    No forced contributions by employers  5  6  7  8 
   
Railroad workers:  Notice of reduction of wages 
required 
1  2 2 2 
   
Fine for no notice of discharge if employee has to give 
notice too 
6  9 10 10 
HOLIDAYS       
    No work on legal holidays  0  0  3  3 
    Labor Day a holiday  29  48  51  51 
    Sunday  labor  fines  43  48 49 50 
MINIMUM WAGES       
    Minimum wage for public work  1  4  9  10 
   
Minimum wage for women/children (<18)  0  0  12  14 
    Minimum Wage Commission  0  0  9  10 
MISCELLANEOUS       
    illegal to desert a ship  5  1  0  0 
    Convict  Labor  Regulations  22  27 32 33 
  Alien Labor       
    Importing alien labor illegal  2  1  0  0 
    No aliens in public employment  5  12  14  17 
    Chinese labor illegal  3  3  3  3 
  Employment Agents         62
    Emigrant agent license  3  6  11  12 
    Regulation of Employment Agencies  11  25  35  42 
Source:   Holmes (2003, chapter 3).  Includes all states as of 1912, Alaska, Hawaii, and the 
District of Columbia.      63
Appendix Table Two 
ESWI and Labor Regulation Spending per Mining and Manufacturing Worker (1967$) 





















Alabama  0.057 0.043 0.105  $0.19  $0.24  $0.55 
Arizona  0.025 0.129 0.274  $0.00  $0.00  $1.32 
Arkansas  0.050 0.130 0.167  $0.19  $0.15  $0.28 
California 0.311  0.376  0.510  $0.16 $0.20 $0.34 
Colorado  0.340 0.470 0.561  $0.93  $1.45  $2.14 
Connecticut  0.307 0.421 0.439  $0.55  $0.49  $0.43 
Delaware  0.070 0.084 0.250  $0.05  $0.14  $0.53 
Florida  0.107 0.097 0.064  $0.00  $0.00  $0.08 
Georgia  0.068 0.062 0.227  $0.00  $0.00  $0.15 
Idaho  0.172 0.254 0.333  $1.07  $1.67  $1.79 
Illinois  0.293 0.369 0.392  $0.70  $0.77  $0.91 
Indiana  0.332 0.442 0.566  $0.48  $0.45  $0.70 
Iowa  0.322 0.347 0.351  $0.39  $0.43  $0.52 
Kansas  0.239 0.326 0.358  $0.67  $0.81  $0.60 
Kentucky 0.124  0.165  0.225  $0.41 $0.47 $0.31 
Louisiana  0.196 0.278 0.340  $0.23  $0.15  $0.19 
Maine  0.200 0.315 0.361  $0.18  $0.33  $0.27 
Maryland  0.151 0.397 0.381  $0.44  $0.52  $0.62 
Massachusetts  0.357 0.435 0.638  $0.77  $1.08  $1.69 
Michigan  0.325 0.445 0.528  $0.48  $0.47  $0.35 
Minnesota  0.347 0.416 0.539  $0.40  $1.12  $1.71 
Mississippi  0.013 0.060 0.110  $0.00  $0.00  $0.15 
Missouri 0.338  0.357  0.381  $0.60 $0.79 $0.68 
Montana  0.355 0.441 0.454  $1.69  $2.11  $2.25 
Nebraska  0.276 0.296 0.290  $0.32  $0.26  $0.33 
Nevada  0.042 0.210 0.470  $0.00  $1.94  $2.64 
New  Hampshire  0.211 0.224 0.453  $0.13  $0.12  $0.29 
New Jersey  0.467  0.306  0.407  $0.32 $0.40 $0.60 
New  Mexico  0.128 0.096 0.222  $0.69  $0.58  $0.57 
New  York  0.272 0.489 0.586  $0.43  $0.50  $1.99 
North  Carolina  0.095 0.142 0.217  $0.12  $0.10  $0.08 
North  Dakota  0.087 0.149 0.275  $1.03  $1.69  $1.96 
Ohio  0.368 0.419 0.524  $0.80  $0.99  $1.93 
Oklahoma  0.043 0.180 0.396  $0.42  $1.60  $1.93 
Oregon  0.037 0.239 0.346  $0.19  $0.15  $0.43 
Pennsylvania 0.417  0.300  0.483  $0.75 $0.81 $1.51 
Rhode  Island  0.209 0.304 0.312  $0.26  $0.32  $0.48 
South Carolina  0.081  0.114  0.260  $0.00 $0.31 $0.24 
South Dakota  0.103  0.131  0.160  $0.40 $0.35 $0.59 
Tennessee  0.203 0.221 0.245  $0.31  $0.69  $0.65   64
Texas  0.115 0.135 0.280  $0.00  $0.11  $0.56 
Utah  0.249 0.274 0.469  $0.84  $0.58  $0.93 
Vermont  0.067 0.103 0.270  $0.00  $0.00  $0.31 
Virginia  0.141 0.189 0.209  $0.08  $0.19  $0.22 
Washington  0.223 0.319 0.447  $0.27  $0.57  $2.55 
West  Virginia  0.149 0.266 0.284  $0.64  $1.03  $2.74 
Wisconsin  0.303 0.398 0.514  $0.56  $0.66  $1.04 
Wyoming 0.179  0.183  0.310  $1.37 $1.42 $1.00 
 
 
Notes.  See text for discussion of how the variables were created.   65
Appendix Table Three 
Labor Regulation COORDINATES ONE AND TWO and Number of Pages of Labor 





























Alabama  -0.471 -0.211 -0.226 0.259 -0.022  0.17 14.47  28.33 
Arizona  -0.577 -0.386 -0.064 -0.127 0.025  0.441  5.88 29.94 
Arkansas  -0.589 -0.229 -0.117 0.28 0.214 0.447  13.77  24.20 
California -0.169  0.139  0.662 0.167 0.032 0.268  20.67  51.19 
Colorado -0.114  -0.114  0.385 0.429 0.429 0.543  34.48  61.56 
Connecticut -0.126  0.354  0.416  -0.356 -0.54 -0.562  17.47  24.03 
Delaware -0.458  -0.261  0.275  -0.193 -0.245  -0.3  9.66 19.35 
Florida  -0.641 -0.187 -0.186 -0.125 -0.254 -0.253 6.99 11.81 
Georgia  -0.477 -0.329 -0.195 -0.224 -0.348 -0.358 10.52 13.24 
Idaho  -0.597 0.022 0.057 0.093 0.095 0.089  15.29  23.61 
Illinois -0.174  0.224  0.326  0.218 0.361 0.208  44.14  79.10 
Indiana -0.12  0.272  0.389  0.465 0.542 0.498  41.34  74.38 
Iowa -0.179  0.17  0.258  0.495 0.211 0.221  19.23  37.53 
Kansas -0.211  0.131  0.235  0.464 0.196 0.403  28.03  35.63 
Kentucky -0.289  0.063  0.05  0.161 0.028 0.037  16.03  22.14 
Louisiana  0.028 0.276 0.271 -0.134 -0.3 -0.322  14.06  25.13 
Maine  -0.288 0.151 0.205 -0.516 -0.623 -0.637 9.45 21.08 
Maryland -0.187  -0.118  0.414 0.483 0.474 0.377  34.19  40.48 
Massachusetts  0.167 0.346 0.765 -0.333 -0.605 -0.606 44.06 83.40 
Michigan  0.153 0.171 0.416 -0.097 -0.102 0.052 32.71 45.37 
Minnesota  0.155 0.275 0.242 -0.119 -0.024  0.34  25.97 39.89 
Mississippi  -0.584 -0.525 -0.288 -0.269  -0.38  -0.369 5.59  9.70 
Missouri  0.287 0.407 0.447 0.287 0.051 0.046  44.38  52.11 
Montana -0.385  0.087  0.225  0.163 0.528 0.454  29.67  51.69 
Nebraska -0.217  -0.208  0.22  -0.409 -0.335 -0.418 14.84 33.98 
Nevada -0.557  -0.551  0.084  -0.135 -0.131 0.388  9.66 28.33 
New Hampshire  -0.134  -0.104  0.28  -0.448 -0.427 -0.604 10.19 14.67 
New Jersey  0.196  0.23  0.521  -0.116 -0.314 -0.024 32.55 50.60 
New  Mexico  -0.497 -0.485 -0.236 -0.008 0.057  0.32  5.84 15.26 
New  York  0.283 0.664 0.676 -0.027 -0.116 -0.128 59.51 92.34 
North  Carolina  -0.625 -0.226 -0.211 0.266 0.171 -0.022 9.12 16.28 
North Dakota  -0.438  -0.433  0.048 -0.459 -0.276  0.01 12.41  15.60 
Ohio 0.27  0.27  0.633  0.118 0.118 0.181  42.41  83.23 
Oklahoma -0.518  -0.284  0.291  -0.263 0.32 0.423 3.53  36.26 
Oregon -0.602  -0.209  0.37  -0.144 -0.393 0.016 21.62 29.22 
Pennsylvania 0.498  0.507  0.67  0.129 0.082 0.041  99.62  130.96 
Rhode Island  -0.029  -0.034  0.071 -0.592 -0.589 -0.621 15.04 18.93 
South  Carolina  -0.636 -0.379 -0.119 -0.103 -0.066 -0.106 10.11 15.18 
South Dakota  -0.262  -0.244  -0.109 0.056 0.001  0.13  9.78 16.53 
Tennessee -0.215  0.189  0.129  0.205 0.189 -0.062  24.86  34.57   66
Texas -0.602  -0.271  0.225  -0.261 0.207 0.487 19.60  27.95 
Utah -0.263  -0.275  0.106  0.501 0.569 0.387  18.74  24.83 
Vermont -0.42  -0.42  0.035  -0.476 -0.477 -0.505 4.48 12.90 
Virginia  -0.502 0.025 0.099 -0.278 -0.149 -0.094 9.82 22.77 
Washington -0.213  0.083  0.113 0.313 0.309 0.368  28.60  41.57 
West Virginia  -0.224  0.112  0.113 0.318 0.283 0.283  20.14  21.59 
Wisconsin  -0.006 0.256 0.543 -0.174 -0.15 -0.238  33.78  59.58 
Wyoming -0.209  -0.2  0.084 0.527 0.523 0.452  16.36  21.46 
 
 
Notes.  See text for discussion of how variables were created.   
 
*The page numbers for 1914 do not include pages of text devoted to Workers’ Compensation 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1For examples of recent political science articles that cite Walker and various other metrics for 
measuring policy and attitudes in an empirical settings, see Provost (2006) and Simmons and Elkins 
(2004).  Among economic historians, Tomas Nonnenmacher (2002) has used Walker’s information to develop 
alternative metrics. 
2For example, see the work of Jacobs and Tope (2005) on changes in crime and the influx of 
minorities into areas and their influence on liberal voting records in Congress..    
3The Heritage Foundation posts the latest version of the Index of Economic Freedom at its 
website, http://www.heritage.org/Index/.   Freedom House posts historical listings of their scores in 
excel files at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1.  An overview of these measures was 
reported in a World Bank working paper by Gerardo Munck (2003) at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMOVOUTPOV/Resources/2104215-
1148063363276/071503_Munck.pdf.  For examples of empirical studies that use these measures see 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Knack and Kiefer (1995), Feng (2003), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004, 526-9), and sources cited there. 
4For examples, see Friedman (1998, 2002) on the U.S. and France and the role of the South 
within the United States, Rosenbloom (2002, 1998) on the development of U.S. regional and inter-
regional labor markets and strike activity.  For discussions of the role of the state in U.S. labor relations 
in the early twentieth century, see Brody (1980), Montgomery (1987), and Dubofsky (1994).   Brody 
(2005), and Tope (2007) discuss the interaction between government policies and the decline of 
unionism in the United States.  International comparisons illustrate the importance of the state.  See 
Howell (1992, 2005) on the role played by governments in industrial relations in France, and Britain 
and the volume on 34 countries edited by Phelan (2007).    
5In the area of labor laws, Fishback and Kantor (2000 and 1995) and Allen (2005) developed summary 
measures designed to capture the generosity of workers’ compensation benefits.  In a similar fashion, Boyer 
(1990) constructed a variety of measures of the nature of poor relief for children in Britain during the 
Industrial Revolution. For other examples, see Currie and Ferrie, 2000; Eyestone 1977; Botero, et. al. 
2004, and the papers in Freeman and Ichniowski (1989).   Wallace, Rubin, and Smith (1988) used 
information from an unpublished working paper by Ann Orloff (1983) to develop a labor law count of 
“pro-labor laws,” but we have not been able to find a measure of that count as yet.         
6See Brandeis (1966).  For a discussion of the role played by institutional labor economists see Moss (1996).  
7This finding helps explain why many studies have found relatively small effects of several 
forms of labor regulation.   For example, see Moehling (1999), Sanderson (1974), Osterman (1979), 
Brown Christiansen, and Phillips (1982), and Carter and Sutch (1996a) on child labor, Goldin (1990) 
and Whaples (1990a, b) on women’s hours laws, Fishback and Kantor (2000), Buffum (1992), Chelius 
(1976, 1977), Fishback (1986, 1987, 1990), and Aldrich (1997) on workers’ compensation and 
employer liability laws, Fishback (1986, 1990) on coal mining regulations, and Aldrich (1997, 2006) on 
safety regulations in manufacturing, mines, and railroads.  Child labor legislation had little impact on 
employment of children, but Margo and Finegan (1996) and Lleras-Muney (2002) find that school 
attendance legislation did significantly raise the rate of school attendance.  A number of regulations had 
larger impact.  Here we are citing findings of limited impact.     
8 The exceptions were railroads, maritime workers and other workers who routinely travelled 
across state boundaries when they worked.  Yet, as will be seen below the states also adopted 
regulations of railroads.  For more detail on railroads, see Aldrich (1997, 2006). 
9For recent quantitative studies of occupational licensing see Law and Kim (2005) and Law and 
Marks (2009). 
10A longer description of the ESWI with comparisons to the other methods for summing the 
laws is provided in Holmes, Fishback, and Allen (2008).    73
                                                                                                                                                          
11For the licensing categories we used the shares of people in the profession from that national 
census.  
12 We explored use of two other denominators, the total number of workers in gainful 
employment in 1900 as the base and the number of workers gainfully employed in mining and 
manufacturing.  These two measures were correlated with the employment base in the text at levels 
above 0.8 and we don’t believe they will change the conclusions much. 
13 The 1905 Lochner v. New York Supreme Court decision that declared unconstitutional limits 
on bakers’ hours in New York chilled efforts to establish wages and hours limits for male workers for 
some time. 
14We also need to consider the issue of what weight to give to other hours laws for men in other 
industries after the Lochner decision.  We plan to work on this issue further.  
15The coverage of the general hours laws and industry-specific hours laws is extremely 
confusing and we are still working on better ways to understand situations where there appears to be 
overlap in coverage.   
16We do all of the weighting by employment share within the subcategory indexes, so we do not 
need to weight again when summing across subcategories to develop the general index. 
17Recent popular media that oversell the role of the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire include von Drehle 
(2003) and the widely seen PBS special on the history of New York and its companion volume by 
Burns, Sanders, and Ade (2003).  Stein (1962), McEvoy (1995), and Fishback 2006 offer discussions 
that show more fully the extent of regulation before and after the fire.    
18We developed a rough count of the number of characters on a standard line for each volume 
by measuring the word employer, which was 1.3 millimeters in length in all volumes and dividing into 
the width of the page (11.1 millimeters in the 1896, and 9.2, 9.4, and 9.5 millimeters in the 1904, 1907, 
and 1914 volumes).  We then counted the lines on a full page of text (68 in 1896, 65 in 1904, 66 in 
1907, and 67 in 1914.  We adjusted for the amount of text for each state on the beginning and ending 
pages of their sections in the book.  This is still a rough measure because we did not adjust for spacing 
in the pages caused by law titles or for footnotes, of which there were not many.  The BLS also reported 
on laws in 1925 but provided abbreviated descriptions of some laws when they had changed little from 
the 1914 volume; therefore, we could not use the information effectively. 
19 We are considering incorporating some type of H-index to capture diversity of industries 
when trying to explain the indices, and also controlling for the diversity in regressions on productivity, 
hours, and earnings. 
20 The measure in the text is a summary measure that combines all aspects of labor 
administration and enforcement.  We have tried to separate out the specific appropriations for 
inspections (even to the level of differences for mining and factory inspectors) as opposed to 
administration for all of the states.  We have succeeded so far in making this separation for only a 
subset of the states.  In several states the appropriations are not separated into specific categories.  Since 
our focus is on comparisons across all states we use the broadest measure of labor administration, 
which is comparable across states.   
21The number employed in mining and manufacturing comes from the occupational information 
reported in the population Censuses of 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 (U.S. Bureau of the Census,1902, 
vol. 2, 508; 1913, vol. 4, 44-45; 1923, vol. 4, 48; 1933, vol 5, 54).  To get values in the intervening 
years we use a straight-line interpolation between census years.   The number gainfully employed 
includes agricultural workers and thus overstates the number of workers who were likely to be covered 
by labor regulations.   We have explored dividing by the number of gainfully employed workers, which 
includes a larger number of workers in agriculture.  It turns out that the cross-sectional correlations 
between spending per mining and manufacturing workers and the spending per gainfully employed 
worker are above .86 in 1903, 1909, and 1916.  The cross-sectional correlations in the changes in the 
two measures between 1903 and 1909, 1903 and 1916, and 1909 and 1916 are all above 0.88.  
Therefore, we only report the measure divided by the mining and manufacturing workers in the text.       74
                                                                                                                                                          
22We have computerized information on fines for many specific laws, but we have not yet 
determined a way to incorporate them into the analysis.  One reason we have not pursued this further is 
that in situations where fines were high, enforcers appeared to be less willing to impose them.     
23Rebecca Holmes (2003, 2005) used principal component analysis to perform a similar data 
mining exercise with the law data in her dissertation.   We switched to the Optimal Classification 
measure because factor analysis is better suited to settings where the variables analyzed are continuous, 
while the procedures that create the COORDINATE measures are specifically designed for variables 
that are zero-one in nature.      
24 We estimated the COORDINATES using the Optimal Classification procedure used by Poole 
and Rosenthal and described on Poole’s website at the University of California at San Diego:  
http://voteview.com/.   Sam Allen made adjustments to the program to fit our analysis.  The procedure 
takes multiple binary choices for numerous decision-makers and non-parametrically infers 
"coordinates" for each decision-maker that yield the greatest number of correctly classified choices.  In 
Poole and Rosenthal’s example for Congress, the decision-makers are legislators and the choices are 
roll call votes that take the form Yea or Nay.  Each legislator has an ideal coordinate within a unit 
hypersphere where the dimensions are arbitrarily chosen.  These are not ever observed since only 
Yes/No votes are recorded.   In our instance, the decision-makers are states, the choices are yes or no on 
enactment of 140 specific types of labor laws.  The procedure will work with missing values, but 
generally this does not happen as our 48 states either had the labor legislation or did not at any given 
point in time.  
The number of law choices determines the number of "cutting planes" through the unit 
hypersphere.  As more laws are considered, the unit hypersphere can be divided into more 'regions' or 
slices.  Each decision-maker is assumed to have an ideal location within the hypersphere corresponding 
to its ideal combination of yes/no choices.  Each decision-maker is assumed to select the yes or no 
choice closest to its ideal coordinate.  The optimal classification program developed by Poole and 
Rosenthal essentially 'moves' the cutting lines to create regions that minimize the number of 
classification errors.  In this context a classification error might mean placing states that voted against 
mining laws with states that voted for mining laws.  As the number of decisions increases, the ideal 
coordinates for each decision maker are measured more precisely.   
Essentially, after choosing a pair of starting coordinates and two dimensions, the estimation 
processes each decision in an iterative fashion and estimates the coordinates for each state that 
minimize the number of classification errors.  The number of decisions examined for each state-year 
was 140.  After the estimation was complete the program showed the number of decisions correctly 
classified for each state year.  The mean and median for the percentage correctly classified for the 1392 
state-year observations were both 86.4 percent.  The highest percentage was 97.1 (Oregon in 1901 and 
Arizona in 1900) and the lowest 69.3 (Washington in 1921-1924). 
25The employment shares came from the occupational censuses of 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930 
with interpolations based on national employment totals between the census years. 
26 The data come from the Workers’ Compensation data sets developed by Price Fishback and 
Shawn Kantor and located at Price Fishback’s website at the University of Arizona Economics 
Department.  The excel files and descriptions of the construction of and the sources of the data are 
provided there.  The sources and data are also described in Fishback and Kantor (2000, 260-7)   
27 For examples of discussions of the southern legacy of slavery and the impact on southern 
labor markets, see Friedman (2000), Rosenbloom (2002), and Wright (1986). The south includes the 
following slave state members of the confederacy:  Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.     
28 See Mulligan and Shleifer for one argument along these lines. 
29The gainfully employed in agriculture include farmers and anybody who describes themselves as 
gainfully employed in a farming occupation.     75
                                                                                                                                                          
30We focus on the magnitude of the OSD effects in the tradition of “oomph” social science that 
McCloskey and Ziliak (2004, 2008) are working to promote.  We also talk about the precision of the fit with 
respect to Type I error as a means of taking into the potential errors in inference that might arise when there are a 
small number of observations.  The small number contributes to a greater likelihood of Type II error.      
31For example, see Fishback (1998), Fishback and Kantor (2000), Lubove (1967), Moss (1996), 
Weinstein (1967, 1968), Wiebe (1962),   
32The South was notable for having less unionization in industries where nation-wide unions 
were relatively strong (Friedman (2000).  We have tried estimating the regressions with interaction 
terms between the South dummy and the Unionization index.  The results changed very little and the 
coefficients on the interaction terms were generally small and statistically insignificant.   